VSV00002 Data leak – ‘-sfile’ Stevedore transient objects

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VSV00002 Data leak – ‘-sfile’ Stevedore transient objects
=========================================================

CVE-2017-8807

Date: 2017-11-15

A wrong if statement in the varnishd source code means that synthetic
objects in stevedores which over-allocate, may leak up to page size of
data from a malloc(3) memory allocation.

In a unpredictable percentage of the cases where this condition
arises, a segmentation fault will happen instead.

All the following conditions are required to trigger the problem:

* A `-sfile` or `-spersistent` stevedore must be configured

* A synthetic object must be created in `vcl_backend_error{}`

* The synthetic object ends up in the `file` or `persistent` stevedore.

For the third condition can arise in two different ways:

* The stevedore named `Transient` is configured as `-sfile` or `-spersistent`
(The default is `-smalloc`)

* The default stevedore is `-sfile` or `-spersistent` and the synthetic
object is given a TTL larger than the `shortlived` parameter
(default: 10 seconds.)

It is not inconceiveable that an attack can provoke this situation
on vulnerable varnishd instances, where the leaked memory contains
confidential data and therefore we have classified this as a security
vulnerability.

Mitigation is possible from VCL or by updating to a fixed version
of Varnish Cache.

Versions affected
– —————–

* 4.1.0 to 5.2.0

Versions not affected
– ———————

* All releases up to but not including 4.1.0
* Varnish Cache Plus from Varnish Software.

Fixed in
– ——–

* 4.1.9 and forward
* 5.2.1 and forward

Mitigation from VCL
– ——————-

Do not configure the Transient storage with `-sfile` or `-spersistent`
stevedores.

Do not assign ttls longer than the parameter `shortlived` in
`vcl_backend_error{}`

Source code fix
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

https://github.com/varnishcache/varnish-cache/commit/176f8a075a

Thankyous and credits
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Github user @shamger submitted a fix for the segmentation fault issue.

Carlo Cannas of Altervista.org pointed out that the data-leak was
a security issue.

Martin and Espen from Varnish Software has done most of the work
on this security incident.

And yes: I apologize for getting the code wrong in the first place.

*phk*
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Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
phk@FreeBSD.ORG | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
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